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Abstract. This article describes two common political positions on the Clinton Administration's proposal 
to allocate an additional $18 billion to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and then offers a less 
common position. The three positions may be differentiated by the psychological construct of cognitive 
complexity. 
 
The United States Congress--especially the House of Representatives--has continued to impede the 
Clinton Administration's efforts to allocate an additional $18 billion to the IMF. Some of the impediment 
has more to do with attempts to thwart any Clinton policy initiative, to further anti-abortion initiatives 
perceived as anathema by the Administration, and to play the many angles of domestic politics. 
However, there also appears to be a sincere policy difference between Congressional opponents and 
supporters of the allocation. 
 
Opponents claim that IMF involvement with financial crises negatively reinforces the inappropriate 
behavior of people who created them. That is, the allocation of IMF funds in crises first removes 
investors, policymakers, creditors, and, less often, depositors and debtors--the corrupt, the 
incompetent, the unlucky--from an aversive situation and then increases the probability that their 
inappropriate economic decisionmaking will occur in the future. Opponents also claim that IMF 
positively reinforces the same inappropriate decisionmaking through anticipatory symbolic processing--
i.e., through the activation of expectations that financial disaster will be righted by the IMF and then 
through the IMF's meeting of these expectations. Lastly, opponents maintain that IMF intervention 
often threatens the political integrity of a country or region through demands for austerity that may 
balance national and international books but challenge the material existence of most of a population. 
 
Supporters of the $18 billion allocation claim that the current era of globalization continues to reinforce 
international economic interdependence and synergy. Windfalls and successes anywhere can 
strengthen the whole, while disasters and failures can precariously weaken it. Without IMF intervention-
-the argument goes--a spreading activation of financial horror is more likely. More and more 
populations and more of each population may be materially challenged. IMF intervention becomes the 
adaptive strategy of last resort--sometimes preventing arrival at a crisis of last resort. 
 
These two very different positions seem to pose as stalking horses for ideologies comprising key 
concepts of political isolationism, interventionism, even Manicheanism and eschatology. Another 
position--less overtly ideological--is to consider the many potential consequences, positive and negative, 
of IMF involvement. Depending on political, social, cultural, and economic phenomena including the 
historic moment, government and IMF officials can develop positions on whether IMF involvement is 
necessary and, if so, what kind and how much. There will be times when various combinations of those 
involved in a financial disaster will be helped or not. There will be times when the consequences for 
local, regional, and global economic and political integrity will be helped or not. From the consequences 
will come narratives informing the next opportunity or threat of IMF involvement. With this perspective, 
one may judiciously support the $18 billion allocation. 
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Cognitive complexity--the psychological construct denoting how many options one can generate and 
how different they are from each other--offers a key to best employ the IMF through action and 
nonaction. How one can best induce cognitive complexity in policymakers is itself an $18 billion 
question. (See Cognitive complexity, moral complexity, and foreign policy: Commonalities between 
President Suharto and William Weld. (August 8, 1997). IBPP, 3(2); Hutus and Tutsis: A case for cognitive 
complexity and social intelligence in foreign policy. (November 15, 1996). IBPP, 1(3); Krugman, P. (May 
15, 1998). The indispensable I.M.F. The New York Times, p. A23; Lunt, P. (1996). Rethinking the 
relationship between economics and psychology. Journal of Economic Psychology, 17, 275-287; 
Middleton, E. (1996). Adaptation level and "animal spirits." Journal of Rconomic Psychology, 17, 479-
498; Rosenberg, S.W. (1995). Against neoclassical political economy: A political psychological critique. 
Political Psychology, 16, 99-136; Theodoulou, S. (1996). Construing economic and political reality. 
Journal of Economic Psychology, 17, 499-516.) (Keywords: Cognitive Complexity, Economics.) 
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